On Overcoming Incongruities

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Dear students and guests,

I am honoured by being invited to this wellknown and worldwide estimated University of Cairo in order to participate to this conference with the subject “Theory and Practice” and, furthermore, to present a paper to this conference. For about two months ago, I wasinvited to come to this conference by professor Hoda El-Khouly, who two years ago was elected to membership of the Institut International de Philosophie de Paris; so since that time we are collegues.

Of course, I am interested in this subject “Theory and Practice” since my early youth, i.e.: since Gertrud Leuze, my former teacher in Latin, in early summer of 1955 gave me books which contained translations of Pláton’s dialogues. But lateron the academic career lead me to fields of research somehow far away from this subject.

Therefore I now am not familiar with the results in this field established by other philosophers during the past decades; and therfore it probably may happen that everything of which I am presenting here was developed by othersones already earlier and perhaps in every relevant detail. The only thing which I am sure is that I will be able to defend all the statements which I will present during the next half an hour.

There are, of course, some connections between what ought to be and what is the case resp. what the person who intends to act believes what is the case, i.e.: within objective morality resp. subjective morality. Two of them are the main connections, namely: Within statements of obligation, inside of the operator “ought” the concepts
used there are altogether concepts of the informative aspect of using the resp. language; i.e.: they are concepts which are developed in order to receive knowledge of the resp. universe of discourse. And within conditional statements of obligation, the resp. circumstances, which determine the area of the obligation, are statements of a purely informative language as long as they themselves do not contain deontic operators like “ought” or “must”.

In the sense of Kant, they are not categorical imperatives but hypothetical imperatives. And Hume, in distinction to Kant, was concerned solely with these hypothetical imperatives, be they general ones or be they particular ones; like the early Kant, he did not even regard something like some categorical imperative.

Now, according to Hume’s law, statements of obligations of this kind cannot be derived from statements of facts; and this thesis will be shared by all those philosophers who are sufficiently familiar with formal logic in general and deontic logic in particular. And regarding this thesis from a logical point of view, I too share this thesis.

But there were philosophers of the school of ordinary language philosophy who did not share this thesis.

One of them is A.N. Prior.¹ His argument runs as follows: »The descriptive assertion “John Miller is a sea captain” logically implies the imperative statement “John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do”«. At a first glance, this conclusion seems to be an imperative, and even more a categorical imperative; and this imperative seems to be a logical consequence of that assertion of a state of affairs.

But there is something wrong concerning that first glance, as easily may be regarded from a logical point of view. For if that derivation were a logical one, it were independent from the sense esp. of the expression “sea captain”. And therefore we therein may substitute

¹ See e.g. A.N. Prior  XYX  .
the expression “sea captain” by “pickpocket” or even by “murderer”; and the result of this substitution will consist in the assertion: »[The descriptive statement] “John Miller is a pickpocket” logically implies [the imperative statement] “John Miller ought to do what a pickpocket ought to do”«, resp. “»[The descriptive statement] John Miller is a murderer” logically implies [the imperative statement] “John Miller ought to do what a murderer ought to do”«. But even ordinary language philosophers – hopefully – will deny that these derived arguments are logically cogent ones.

And there is still another hint that creates reasonable doubts whether that argument could be one of deductive logic. For within that statement “John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do” the expression “ought” does not occur once only but twice; and this leads to the assumption that this statement is a hypothetical one of the kind “If this in an obligation then that is an obligation”.

And this assumption is vindicated by analyzing “John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do” in the sense of logic like this was developed by G. Frege as “If whenever someone is a sea captain he ought to behave according to a sea captain’s [code of honour], then John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain’s [code of honour]”. Regarding this analysis, Prior’s argument decreases to the simple case of modus ponens of formal logic: »Given “John Miller is a sea captain” and “Whenever someone is a sea captain he ought to behave according to a sea captian’s [code of honour]”; then this entails logically “John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain’s [code of honour]”«.

This analysis cogently shows that it is not the case that an ought-

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1 In the sense of G.E. Moore, this hypothetical imperative is a bridge principle. But in general such bridge principles are false because of the incompleteness of their premises, as was pointed out already by G.E. Moore.
statement is derived from an is-assertion but that in fact an ought-statement is derived from another ought-statement together with an is-assertion which describes some circumstances.

In order to use Kant’s terminology, that logical entailment my be logically transformed to: »“Whenever someone is a sea captain he ought to behave according to a sea captain’s [code of honour]” entails logically “When John Miller is a sea captain then he ought to behave according to a sea captain’s [code of honour]”«. Then the first of these two implications turn out to be a general hypothetical imperative, while the second one is a particular hypothetical imperative.

Up to now I used the expression “sea captain” in the purely descriptive sense according to “possessing the licence of working as sea captain”. But it may be that prior used “sea captain” in the sense of “possessing the licence of working as sea captain and feeling obliged to the sea captain’s [code of honour]”. But then Prior in fact derives an ought-statement not from an is-assertion but from another ought-statement.

But most probably Prior and his followers were not aware that by using the one expression “sea captain” they used it according to the two concepts, i.e.: within the premise according to “possessing the licence of working as sea”, and within the conclusion according to “possessing the licence of working as sea captain and feeling obliged to the sea captain’s [code of honour]”. But then their argument is, of course, a fallacy in the sense of logic.

Still less sophisticated is the argument presented by J. Searle.¹ For his argument run as follows: »From “John Miller promised to pay Jack Smith 5.000,-- dollars” it logically follows “John Miller ought to pay Jack Smith 5.000,-- dollars”«.

This may in fact be the case, namely: when the concept

¹ See J. Searle XYX.
“promised” is used according to rules so that it entails the rules of using the concept “ought to”. But then, again, not an is-assertion entails logically –resp. analytically– an ought-statement but in fact an ought-statement entails logically –resp. analytically– another ought-statement, comparable to the entailment: “John Miller is a bachelor” logically – resp. analytically– entails “John Miller is a [male] man”.

But this is not the case when the concept “promised” is used according to rules so that it does not entails the rules of using “ought to” i.e.: if it is ussed in a purely descriptive sense.

But most probably also Searle and his followers were not aware that by using the one expression “promising” they used it according to the two concepts, i.e.: within the premise according to “having performed some verbal act”, and within the concluion according to “being obliged to perform some physical act according to that verbal act. But then their argument is, of course, a fallacy in the sense of logic.

In order to transform that argument into a logically valid one we have to add another statement to the former premise, namely: “Whenever someone promises something to some person then he is obliged to give this other person what was promised to give”. But this premise –this bridge principle– is nothing but a general hypothetical imperative. Therefore, again, an ought-statement is logically derived from a set of premises which necessarily contain some ought-statement but not from a set of purely is-statements.

By the way: Also here Moore is vindicated. For if I am promising something I may not be aware thereby that I will not be able to do what I promised, or that in the meantime I will become unable to do it, or that things outside of me changed in a manner that I really should not do what I promised, or ...

The ordinary languages in general and the English language in particular sometimes are hiding –or even disregarding– structures of logic; for they arised because of other causes and circumstances than
that of rational decisions made within the area of exactly analyzing philosophy.

Still less sophisticated, too, is the argument presented by A. MacIntyre.¹ For his argument runs as follows: »From: “This watch of mine is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and in addition too heavy to carry about comfortably” the evaluative conclusion validly follows: “This is a bad watch”«.

Of course, this conclusion is convincing to MacIntyre concerning the circumstances of his life as a university teacher. But surely it would not be accepted by him if he had to stay alone at some lost island like Robinson Crusoe when suddenly waves brought some piece of luggage to the beach containing such a watch, or when this watch is a heirloom of his father and of his grandfather and of his great-grandfather, or ..., and so on.

In order to make this argument logically cogent and therefore valid, again such a bridge principle has to be added as an additional premise to the given premise: a universal statement which in this universality surely is false.

Of course, according to MacIntyre’s view the sense of the expressions “grossly inaccurate” etc. already contain the sense of “bad”. But then, again, an evaluative statement is not derived from non-evaluative statements but from evaluative ones, comparable to the case of deriving “man” from “bachelor”.

But as soon as not cases of derivation by using the theorem of identity are meant but cases of really interesting derivations, everytime such bridge principles hidden in the mental background are used and are to be brought to the light by using a logical correct analysis.

This holds when an assertoric logic is involved but also when some deontic logic is used.²

¹ See A. MacIntyre XYY.
² By the way: In philosophical analyses I myself do not use modal logics and deontic logics; for these intensional means are too weak w.r.t. receive strong results. On the contrary, according to Carnap I am using the extensional equivalences at the resp. meta-levels.
Thereby a deontic logic is to be embedded into a modal logic according to the principle that there is no obligation beyond possibility. By regarding the semantics of such systems of logic, this may be seen: If there were some correct derivation from an is-statement to a necessary-statement then this modal logic would collapse to the assertoric logic which underlies that modal logic, like the assertion: “Everything which is the case, is necessarily the case, and vice versa”;\(^1\) as well as:

“Everything which is the case, is good res. is ought, and vice versa”.\(^2\)

But since there is no correct derivation of such a kind, therefore in addition bridge principles are needed; but they mostly are false.

In fact, these hypothetical imperatives are urgently needed in order to refer what is ought to do with the empirical world in which actions have to happen; in this sense they function as bridges between the empirical world and – using Kant’s terminology again – moral world.

Kant’s categorical imperative\(^3\) does not contain such a bridge-function, in his terminology: it is not a hypothetical imperative; for it is

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1 I suppose that Leibnitz was not the first philosopher who implicitly maintained a position of this kind.
2 According to Thomas Aquinas, a statement of this kind may be formulated like: “Omne ens est bonum”.
   But assertions of that kind were formulated much earlier like the Creator’s observation according to the Gospel: “... and He saw that [this which was ceated by Hin] was good”.
3 Both the Kantian *categorical imperative* and the Rawlsian *veil of ignorance* are to be regarded as sophisticated elaboration of the old *Golden Rule*.
   Of course, for ordinary purposes the Golden Rule is – and will remain to be– a very useful instrument to direct one’s mind into the direction of morality.
   According to our fragmentary knowledge of the philosophies of the ancient world, this Golden Rule was already known about in the 6th century BC at least in China, in India, and in Egypt. But most surely, this knowledge is much older, is milleniums older, is –as I believe– as old as the resp. societies of prehistorical mankind contained priests.
   But we do not know anything of the former periods of mankind when knowledge was transmitted only orally.
not—according to Kant: it must not be—connected with empirical conditions. Therefore according to Kant, a categorical imperative does not—cannot—logically imply some hypothetical imperative. This is related to the fact that the principle of causality does not—and cannot—logically imply some causal law. But the principle of causality is an apriorical criterion concerning the correctness of an aposteriorical causal law, determining thereby whether or not this empirical law is congruent with the content of that apriorical principle; and in the related manner a categorical imperative an apriorical criterion concerning the correctness of a hypothetical imperative, determining thereby whether or not this hypothetical imperative is congruent with the content of that categorical imperative.¹

By the way: Kant mentioned more than one version of the categorical imperative; and in a strict sense of the word these versions are not logically equivalent. But they are congruent to one another in that sense that w.r.t. the hypothetical imperatives they seem to lead to the same results, at least in an approximative manner.

They all are sophisticated elaborations of the Golden Rule. This Golden Rule may be stated in both directions as follows:

GR: “Do to another what you like them to do you; and do not do to another what you do not like them to do you!”

This Golden Rule may be regarded as an approximate rule. For purposes of everyday situations² this rule mostly is sufficiently precise. Nevertheless it is the obligation of philosophers to clear and to clean it

¹ In congruence with Kant it may be said: The principle of causality has to be is-apriorically [= i-apriorically] true concerning the is-world [= i-world], whereas the categorical imperative, being a principle of morality, has to be ought-apriorically [= o-apriorically] true concerning the ought-world [= o-world].

² The Golden Rule still may be regarded as an approximate rule, being valid in even this sense, i.e.: not in a strict sense, not without thereby involving suitable probability considerations.

Everyday situations may include resp. should include situations of dispensation of justice and situations of politics.

NB: This Golden Rule, too, is an unconditional rule; and it therefore may be regarded as the arcahic form of a categorical imperative.
up to that point where it seems that no further objection may be possible. Among Kant’s results of analyzing it, this one is the most famous one:¹

CI: “Act only to that maxim whereby at the same time you can will that it should become a universal law!”

Up to now it seems to be the still best mental instrument in order to assess hypothetical imperatives w.r.t. their resp. validity.

Whenever someone intends to act with his mind or with his speech or with his body in a conscious manner according to morality, whenever he tries to avoid to act as a roboter but to direct his mind and his speech and his body according to some sound categorical imperative, he then needs to refer to such hypothetical imperatives, be them of universal kind or be them of particular kind, i.e.: specialized to some particular situation.

Let us regard some arbitrary hypothetical imperative in its universal kind. In order to be regarded as valid, the antecedens of this implication has to be seen as being complete.

But in almost all cases of stating this implication its antecedens is incomplete w.r.t. their set of relevant factors, even if this set is finite;² for the complete extension of that set mostly is unknown to us esp. at its periphery. But then a universalization of such an implication with an incomplete antecedens sooner or later will turn out to be invalid; and then they are worthless at least in its philosophical cases of application. But concerning acting a philosopher –i.e.:friend of wisdom– nees such a bridge from the world of facts to the world of morality, which means: he needs such a hypothetical imperative at least in its particular form.

But then the succedens of this non-universalized implication –

¹ This is the famous version of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; see “KrV” and esp. “GMS”.
² If this set is infinite, then the resp. antecedens of the implication is necessarily incomplete, since it is referring to a finite part of tis set only.
where “ought to” resp. “obliged to” is the main logical operator— is to be weighed by a suitable probability factor.¹ And only if the value of this factor turns out to be 1, then the universalization of this implication will be valid, too. But in all major cases this value will be close to 1 only, i.e.: will be 1-ε, where ε is a sufficiently small real number. For purposes of everyday life—including dispensation of justice and of politics—no more is available; and, in fact, no more is needed in order to act.

Concerning the world of facts, we have to stay and to live everytime with uncertainties, mostly identifying thereby approximately identical with identical. And in most cases this kind of living and of experiencing does not lead us to incongruences.² By relating the world of morality to that world of facts by stating a hypothetical imperative, our statements of morality related to—and thus conditioned by—supposed empirical facts, too, become uncertain to some degree.

In order to act in congruence with the principles of morality, we need such guide principles, i.e.: such particular hypothetical imperatives; for the only alternative to using them consists in acting in mental blindness, like it happens to us in actions of reflexes or like a robot is acting.

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1 The objective probability is unknown to us in most cases of intending to act. Therefore, a suitable subjective probability factor is to be used, which is based on some probability distribution according to the apriorically determines assumption of the user.

In epistemology, such a user is to be cleaned from all emotional aspects so that his probability becomes an epistemic probability, in Carnap’s terminology: an inductive method.

2 In fact, this is the manner in which we receive knowledge in everyday situations as well as in scientific situations. For an error caused by perceiving as well as by measuring can only be excluded by probability 1-ε but not by probability 1. Nevertheless, even a physicist mostly will regard 1-ε as being 1, and this both in his performing experiments and in ordinary life; for otherwise he would be unable to proceed here and there.
Of course, identifying approximately identical with identical is a mistake, therefore the rational user – and esp. the philosopher – all the times has to be aware of having done this mistake. For then, if disturbing factors will arise – factors which up to then were not kown and therfore were not regarded by him – he immediately will identify this mistake as the source of being caused now to correct his presuppositions.

Of course, this is all but an easy way of experiencing as well as of acting; but it is the only way which is open to us. And it is much better for us to carefully walk across this way than to perform an agenda of U-turns in mental blindness.

Now, of course, the question arises whether or not there, too, exists a bridge from ought-to-do to-do, i.e.: from insight into morality to action according to this insight. Since the result – the action itself – is neither an outer or an inner speech – i.e.: neither an assertion nor a thought – there is no theoretical path from insight to action: There does not exist a logical conclusion from the one to the other in the positive case and, too, no logical inconsistency in the negative case. And it happenes all but seldom that people do not act according to what they really regard as ought to be done; this negative case is no contradiction but, alas, a reality.

Using the terminology of logic, some statement which is a contradiction describes something which is impossible. But acting in non-congruence with insight into morality is possible; therefore, this incongruences are no contradictions.

Of course, in the positive case we will regard the action as being congruent with the insight, whereas in the negative case we regard what was done as being incongruent to what ought to had been done. And obviously no cogent intellectual bridge from ought-to-do to dois on the horizon.

And if someone’s moral sensitivity is somehow degenerated, no moral argument will lead him to acting according to morality.

But this is not a peculiarity of morality; for things of that kind
may be observed even in seminars on logic: If some student is not even able to use the modus ponens –i.e.: if he does not know how to derive from premises “A” and “If A then B” to the obvious conclusion– then he never will attain some intellectual sense concerning logical consequences.

Therefore, the only way of avoiding such moral inconsequences consists in training one’s own mind to increase his inner sense of being morally consequent.

Without having own experiences of this kind on my disposal I suppose that therefore less effort is needed than what a top-level sportsman was –and still is– to summon up in order to be what intended to become. Therefore such a practical bridge is established individually by performing these three methods:

(1) training, and (2) training, and again (§9 training.

For the steep path from intellectual insight into the moral world to the practical establishing one’s own moral world does not consist in an intellectual manner but in a practical behaviour: in training one’s mind with regard to increase one’s attention and mindfulness and vigilance concerning one’s acting by mind and by speech and by body.

Finally the question arises how to increase these mental factors within one’s mind. Alas, I don’t have a final answer to it at my disposal. But I assume that these things might be helpful in order to make progress on that path:

It is useful to register at a positive case that simultaneously the self-respect increases which then is accompanied with some subtle and for a long time during subtle bliss; and it is useful to want to experience this subtle bliss again and again and longer and still longer and finally never-ending.

And, on the contrary, it is useful to register at a negative case that simultaneously the self-respect decreases which then is accompanied
Wilhelm K. Essler: On Overcoming Incongruities

by inner talking oneself into thinking that it was to do what was done which causes for a long time during disturbances within one’s mind; and it is useful not to want to experience these disturbances.

But someone who is suffering on mental masochism surely will decide to walk the steep path downhill; and no argument whatsoever will convince him.

Therefore, this hinting to self-respect will convince only people which don’t like to keep disturbances dwelling in their respective minds. And they will observe that increasing self-respect increases step by step the respect for other people or even for other sentient beings, as well as that increasing respect for others immediately increases one’s own self-respect.

In this manner, everybody determines his mental destiny in future.

Im Zettaijo [= Festung des Absoluten]
Buddha Śākyamuni
Sŏkrátĕs Kung Fu Zi
Immanuel Kant
Die vier großen Weisen


Eine davon ist der *Shiseidō*, die *Halle der Vier Weisen*, wörtlich übersetzt: die *Halle der Vier Heiligen*.

Diese Halle ist den vier großen Philosophen dieses Erdenrunds gewidmet, hiervon zweien des Orients und zweien des Okzidents. Diese Vier Weisen sind:

:: Kung Fu Zi [die Vorderseite des Tempels];
:: Buddha Śākyamuni [die rechte Seite des Tempels];
:: Sọkrátes [die linke Seite des Tempels];
:: Immanuel Kant [die Rückseite des Tempels].

NB: Der Ausdruck „Heiliger“ ist dabei *nicht* im Sinn mediteraner Groß-Religionen zu verstehen. Vielmehr ist er *hierfür* solche Personen zu verwenden, die das „Erkenne dich selbst!“ verwirklicht haben, die somit zu einem Wissen um sich selbst gelangt sind und sich dieses Wissen zum dauerhaften und stets wirkenden Besitz angeneignet haben, und die daher die Unerschütterlichkeit als Charakterzug besitzen und diese Ausgewogenheit des Geistes daher dauerhaft und ununterbrochen vorweisen.
Vorderansicht des Shiseido, 
der Halle der Vier Weisen
[= der Vier Heiligen]

Die Rückseite des Shiseido, 
die Immanuel Kant gewidmet ist
Die Widmungs-Inschrift an der Decke:

XYX = Kant

Eine andere Pagode in diesem Park ist das Zettaijō, die Festung des Absoluten.

In ihr ist eine Tafel errichtet, auf der Abbildungen dieser Vier Weisen als Maserungen eingraviert sind, hier allerdings in der Anordnung: